Tsinghua Science and Technology
Volume 19

Issue 5

Article 9

2014

Research and Practice of Dynamic Network Security Architecture
for IaaS Platforms
Lin Chen
College of Computer Science, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.

Xingshu Chen
College of Computer Science, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.

Junfang Jiang
College of Computer Science, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.

Xueyuan Yin
College of Computer Science, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.

Guolin Shao
College of Computer Science, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China.

Follow this and additional works at: https://tsinghuauniversitypress.researchcommons.org/tsinghuascience-and-technology
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
Lin Chen, Xingshu Chen, Junfang Jiang et al. Research and Practice of Dynamic Network Security
Architecture for IaaS Platforms. Tsinghua Science and Technology 2014, 19(05): 496-507.

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by Tsinghua University Press: Journals Publishing.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Tsinghua Science and Technology by an authorized editor of Tsinghua
University Press: Journals Publishing.

TSINGHUA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
ISSNll1007-0214ll09/13llpp496-507
Volume 19, Number 5, October 2014

Research and Practice of Dynamic Network Security Architecture
for IaaS Platforms
Lin Chen, Xingshu Chen , Junfang Jiang, Xueyuan Yin, and Guolin Shao
Abstract:

Network security requirements based on virtual network technologies in IaaS platforms and

corresponding solutions were reviewed. A dynamic network security architecture was proposed, which was built
on the technologies of software defined networking, Virtual Machine (VM) traffic redirection, network policy unified
management, software defined isolation networks, vulnerability scanning, and software updates. The proposed
architecture was able to obtain the capacity for detection and access control for VM traffic by redirecting it to
configurable security appliances, and ensured the effectiveness of network policies in the total life cycle of the
VM by configuring the policies to the right place at the appropriate time, according to the impacts of VM state
transitions. The virtual isolation domains for tenants’ VMs could be built flexibly based on VLAN policies or
Netfilter/Iptables firewall appliances, and vulnerability scanning as a service and software update as a service were
both provided as security supports. Through cooperation with IDS appliances and automatic alarm mechanisms,
the proposed architecture could dynamically mitigate a wide range of network-based attacks. The experimental
results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture.
Key words: cloud computing; network security; IaaS; life cycle; network policy

1

Introduction

Cloud computing architecture introduces many
technologies including server virtualization, Network
Virtualization (NV), and Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) to enhance the essential
characteristics of cloud computing[1] . For Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS) platforms, the above technologies
are helpful in building a shared pool of configurable,
elastic resources (e.g., virtual CPU, virtual memory, and
networks). The benefits of virtualization include better
server utilization and consolidation. However, there
are many concerns about networks that accompany the
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above technologies. According to the CSAs security
guidance for cloud computing[2] , Virtual Machines
(VMs) may communicate with each other over an
internal virtual backplane, rather than an external
physical network. As a result, standard network-based
security controls are blind to this traffic and cannot
perform monitoring or in-line blocking. Moreover, the
IaaS environment has dynamic characteristics, such
as elastically provided resources and different VM
life cycle states. When the VM experiences a state of
transition, such as live migration, the existing network
security policies configured for the VM may be lost
and cannot be re-configured into new physical or
virtual network devices automatically. As mentioned
in the NIST security guidance for virtualization
technologies[3] and the ENISA analysis report of risks
and recommendations for cloud computing[4] , there
should be a scalable security management mechanism
that has automatic security policy enforcement within
cloud platforms. Furthermore, because of the shared
multi-tenant model and the dynamic character of
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VMs, the traditional fixed perimeter model is rapidly
becoming obsolete.
To address the above issues, industry, open source
groups, and academia have proposed different
solutions. VM traffic management and privilege
separation of server and network administrators
have seen the development of two new technologies:
Virtual Ethernet Port Aggregator (VEPA), led by
HP, and VN-TAG, proposed by Cisco, which have
drafted international standards named 802.1Qbg[5] and
802.1Qbh[6] , respectively. VEPA includes a standard
mode to forward VM traffic to a physical switch
and a multi-channel mode to tag VM traffic. When
VEPA is used, existing traditional hardware needs
to be supported by minor software and firmware
updates. VN-TAG employs a Port Extender (PE) to tag
VM traffic and cooperates with an external, VN-TAG
aware, enabled physical switch to identify and control
VM traffic. When adopting VN-TAG mode, PE and
VN-TAG aware enabled switches are essential. In IaaS
platform network policy management, VMware[7] has
taken advantage of vMotion and vSphere Distributed
Switch to ensure the effectiveness of VM policy
whenever VM migration occurs. Cisco[8] has developed
a runtime policy resolution mechanism for dynamic
Virtual Interface (VIF) to configure VM network
policy automatically at runtime in the Cisco Unified
Computing System. H3C[9] has invented a VM policy
auto-migration method and device that includes steps
that monitor VM migration events, VM re-location,
and re-configuration policies. Open source research
groups studying underlying Hypervisors (e.g., KVM
and Xen) and top IaaS toolkits (e.g., OpenStack,
OpenNebula, Eucalyptus, etc.) have done some
work on VM policy unified management. Most of
them support limited policies and policies tightly
coupled with the VM startup configuration file but,
because VMs often need to restart when the policies
are changed or re-defined, this has led to a lack of
flexibility in policy change and policy extension. An
example is the policy management mechanism for
802.1Q VLAN and Firewall in OpenNebula, which
couples with the physical host configuration and virtual
network template[10] . The SDN architecture based
on OpenFlow, led by ONF[11] , can realize a uniform
management mechanism for VM traffic forwarding
and fine-grained access control strategies (e.g., L2-L4
access control), but introduces an extra performance
overhead of flow entries request, configuration, and
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query[12] . Moreover, it is not suitable for a scenario that
mainly focuses on auto-managing VM basic network
policies such as VLAN, because it does not need to
make a physical or virtual switch, merely serving as
a data plane. For security perimeters, VMware has
made use of VLAN, VxLAN, and distributed firewalls
to build flexible isolation perimeters, and developed
a VMware NSX proprietary product[13] . OpenNebula,
OpenStack, and Eucalyptus have employed 802.1Q
VLAN, ebtables, or iptables to build basic security
isolation boundaries for tenants’ VMs. As stated
earlier, security-related configurations also tightly
couple with fixed virtual network templates. The
CSA has proposed a Software Defined Perimeter
(SDP) security framework to mitigate a wide
range of network-based attacks[14] . Additionally,
Zhao et al.[15] proposed a mechanism for dynamic
cloud network security, which mainly focuses on
building isolation network perimeters with VDE,
VLAN, and Netfilter/Iptables. Chung et al.[16]
proposed a multi-phase distributed vulnerability
detection,
measurement,
and countermeasure
selection mechanism, built on attack graph analytical
models and reconfigurable virtual network-based
countermeasures. Ficco[17] presented a hybrid and
hierarchical event correlation approach for intrusion
detection in cloud computing. Zakaria et al.[18]
proposed a CDN-based DDoS protection service to
counter attacks targeting application layer of web
servers.
In order to re-obtain the capacity for detection and
access control for VM traffic based on virtual network
architecture, security appliances are configured for
VMs to implement a unified management mechanism
for network policies, including ACLs, QoS, and
VLANs, and to ensure policy effectiveness throughout
the total life cycle of the VM. This provides a flexible
means to build a virtual isolation network, while
keeping abreast of the security situation and autoalert intrusion events. A dynamic network security
architecture for IaaS platforms is proposed in this paper.

2

The Proposed Architecture

The designed dynamic network security architecture
for IaaS platforms is based on the mechanisms of
VM traffic redirection and policy management, security
supporting services, previous works[19-21] , and accords
to the P2DR (Policy, Protection, Detection, and
Response) model and architecture (as shown in Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1

Dynamic network security architecture for IaaS platforms.

The architecture employs a four-layer structure,
which includes a physical resource layer, virtualization
layer, unified resource management layer, and web
layer. Moreover, cloud security components act as
security supports.
(1) Physical resource layer provides physical storage,
computing, and network resources for the IaaS.
(2) Virtualization layer is composed of Hypervisor and
Virtual Ethernet Bridge (VEB) (e.g., Bridge, Open
v-Switch) to virtualize the physical resources.
(3) Unified resource management layer is composed
of resource management and security management
modules. The former is primarily responsible
for managing and monitoring physical/virtual
resources and the VM life cycle. The latter
is mainly in charge of security-related items
including user accounts, resource ACLs,
vulnerability scanning and software updates,
network policy management, etc.
(4) Web layer provides the visualized web interfaces
for administrators and tenants.
(5) Cloud security components act as concrete security
supports, which include physical/virtual resource
access control and monitor functions based
on resource and user identifiers and ACLs,
vulnerability scanning and software update
functions, and configurable security appliances
(e.g., Virtual Firewall/IDS).
The architecture introduces traffic redirection
technology based on SDN architecture to implement
VM traffic detection and elastic access control,

which is composed of a Network Controller (NC)
and VEBs[5] . A unified management mechanism for
network policies was implemented by decoupling
the network-related security configurations from the
VM startup configuration file and VM template file,
and analyzing the impacts on the VIF that were due
to VM state transitions. Additionally, we made use
of the Netfilter/Iptables firewall virtual appliance or
802.1Q VLAN to provide means to build a virtual
isolation network for the tenants’ VMs. Furthermore,
vulnerability scanning as a service, software updates
as a service, and configurable virtual IDS components
were provided to protect the tenants’ assets further.
2.1

VM traffic detection and access control

Before implementing the detection and access control
mechanism for VM traffic, we implemented a unified
resource abstraction and virtualization layer. We
employed Xen as the virtualization Hypervisor and
used OVS (Open v-Switch) as the VEB to support
advanced network policies, including ACLs, VLAN,
etc. Then we employed SDN architecture to realize
a traffic redirection mechanism to detect and control
VM traffic. The virtual network architecture is as
shown in Fig. 2, which constructs a unified linklayer network. The architecture includes an NC and
VEBs. The NC is composed of a OpenFlow Controller
(OFC) and a Self-Defined Controller (SDC). The OFC
aims to obtain detection and access control for VM
traffic, and to manage forwarding strategies in all VEBs
centrally. The SDC also aims to realize access control,
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Fig. 2

Virtual network architecture based on SDN.

while reserving the ability to control and forward
packets in switches. The network architecture is also
applicable when other hypervisors (e.g., KVM) are
adopted.
The architecture takes use of OFC to redirect VM
traffic to specific physical/virtual network devices or
security devices (e.g., IDS, Netfilter/Iptables Firewall)
to re-obtain the capacity for detection and access
control for VM traffic. Then, the traffic is made visible,
detectable, and manageable by corresponding security
appliances. The process of redirecting VM traffic to
security appliances is shown in Fig. 3 and detailed
below.
(1) VM-1 sends traffic
When configuring a security appliance such as an
IDS for VM-1, the SDN controller would generate
a forwarding rule for VM-1 to control its trafficforwarding path. When an SDN switch received a
packet from VM-1 that it had never seen before,
the controller would tell the VM-1 connected switch
how to handle that packet according to the above

Fig. 3
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rule, and would add corresponding flow entries into
the switch. According to Fig. 3, the flow entry was
used to redirect the packet from VM-1 to the IDS
by modifying the native destination MAC address in
the packet to the IDS MAC address, because with the
VM-1 and IDS in a unified Layer 2 environment, the
packet would be redirected to the IDS appliance. Then,
the IDS could visualize and detect VM-1 traffic sent
to VM-2 in the IaaS platform or external internet
hosts. The traffic could be controlled by replacing the
above IDS with a Netfilter/Iptables firewall appliance,
which could be filtered or blocked by configuring
specific Netfilter/Iptables appliances rules. After the
VM-1 packet was detected or filtered by the security
appliances, it would be re-encapsulated according
to its native destination IP address and forwarded
to its native destination by making use of the IP
forwarding function, ‘ip forward’, enabled in security
appliances. Finally, the packet would be sent to VM-2
or external internet hosts on the data network, as shown
in Fig. 2.

The process of redirecting VM traffic to security appliances.
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(2) VM-1 receives traffic
When other VMs such as VM-2 in the IaaS platform
or external internet hosts sent a packet to VM-1 for
the first time, the switch would also send a request
to the controller to obtain flow entries to handle
that packet. Similar to the above scenario, we made
redirection rules and pushed the flow entries into
the switch to redirect those packets to the security
appliance. The rules made a redirect decision according
to the destination MAC and source MAC in the packet
as follows.
(a) If the destination MAC pointed at VM-1, and
the source MAC pointed at the security appliance
configured for VM-1, the packet was forwarded
normally.
(b) Else, the packet would be redirected to the
security appliance by modifying the destination
MAC address in the packet to the MAC address of
the security appliance.
Moreover, we did not handle the ARP and RARP
packets to ensure the Data Link Layer protocols worked
normally. In the above scenario whereby the VM sent
or received packets, there was a rule for ensuring ARP
packets that were forwarded normally. Additionally,
flow entries could be actively pushed into the SDN
switch by the SDN controller without needing to send
a request by SDN switch.
Using the SDN controller application that
implemented the VM traffic redirection mechanism,
we re-obtained the capacity for detection and access
control for VM traffic whether the VMs communicated
with each other over an internal virtual backplane or
by external internet. In addition, the elastic provision
capacity of computing resources and the elastic
capacities of traffic detection and access control
were provided by cooperating with virtual security
appliances, including virtual IDS and virtual firewalls
implemented by NFV technologies. Furthermore, the
dynamic defense feature of network security was
supported, because the intrusion detection results
provided by the IDS could be a basis or guide for
helping tenants to load timely effective defense
rules into related firewall appliances to protect VM
communications.
2.2
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two modes, the network policy information from the
VM startup file and VM template file must first be
decoupled. Then, analyzing the factors that influence
the effectiveness of VM network policies and the
impacts on the VIF that were brought about by VM
state transitions, we defined the essential factors of
dynamic configuration network policies and selected
the appropriate time point to configure the policies at
the right place to ensure their effectiveness during the
total life cycle of the VM. The proposed mechanism is
as shown in Fig. 4. The two modes of VEB working
are the centralized forwarding control mode, based
on OFC, and distributed control mode, based on
SDC, as shown in Fig. 2. The VEB working mode is
controlled via an OVS agent by a network management
sub-module on a management network.
2.2.1

The essential factors of policy configuration

The factors that affect the effectiveness of VM network
policies include the manner of policy bound with the
VM, policy configuration time, policy configuration
location, virtual network model, and the impacts
brought about by VM state transitions, etc. According
to guidelines that configure the policy to the right place
at the appropriate time point, we defined the following
concepts for essential policy configuration factors.
Definition 1 Tetrad. It contained four items, VM
identifier, network policy, policy position, time point,
to present the essential policy configuration factors.
Definition 2 VM identifier. It was a global, unique
identity ID for the VM in the IaaS platform used
to manage, monitor, and bind policies to VMs. We
employed a UUID[22] generator “uuidgen” to generate
the VM ID that was a 256-bit binary number.
Definition 3 Network policy. It defined the
policies including ACLs, QoS, 802.1Q VLAN TAG,
and security appliances configured for VMs (e.g., IDS,
Netfilter/IPtables Firewall), which were associated with
‘VM identifier’ UUID, as shown in Table 1.
Definition 4 Policy position. It designated the
position where to load network policy as defined in
Definition 3, which was closely related to the virtual
network architecture. According to Figs. 2 and 3,
the position was the VM connected switch. For the
centralized forwarding control mode based on the

Network policy unified management

To implement a security policy management
mechanism with a feature of automatic enforcement
of security policies and supporting VEB working on

Table 1 VM VLAN policy.
UUID (VM identifier)
Policy
89506d14-447f-90c1-6c27-7e9b15b9833e VLAN TAG=6
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The mechanism of network policy unified management.

OFC, the position of the VM connected switch was
determined based on the VM identifier and MAC
address through the OFC applications, then the network
policies’ corresponding flow entries were actively
pushed into the switch. For the distributed control mode
based on the SDC, we made use of VM location
information in the resource management module and
developed a lightweight OVS agent that hosted and
ran in every privilege Domain (e.g., Dom0 on Xen) to
retrieve the specific VIF information, based on the VM
identifier and OVS native API, as shown in Fig. 4. Then,
according to the VIF ID and VM location information,
the network policies’ corresponding configurations for
OVS ports were set into the OVS by the SDC and OVS
agent.
Definition 5 Time point. It determined the time to
configure policies for VMs. The time point must be
satisfied that the network policies had been in place
before the VM was accessible and usable. The time
point selective mechanism is as detailed below.
2.2.2 Time point selection
We satisfied the above guidelines for time point
selection and supported the two VEB working modes
by identifying the VM state transitions that affected
the effectiveness of VIF policies according to the
VM life cycle state diagram and VIF state, as shown
in Fig. 5. Timely policy configuration operations for

those VMs that needed to re-configure policies at the
moment of state transition finished successfully. The reconfiguration operations were performed by the OFC or
the SDC, according to the specific working mode of the
VM connected switch.
As shown in Fig. 5, when a cloud user submits
a request to create a VM instance, the resource
management module prepares a VM image and selects
a physical host that fulfills the performance parameters
to run the VM instance. Then, the management module
makes use of hypervisor APIs to manage the VM
after the VM template image has been successfully
transferred to the selected host.
The VIF and VIF ID can change with VM
state transitions. Take the VM state changing from
“Running” to “Hibernate” as an example. When a
VM is in “Running” state, the VIF exists and is
enabled, and VIF ID = X. At this point, the network
policy configuration relates to the VIF state mainly
in centralized forwarding control OFC mode, and
primarily relates to VIF ID in distributed control SDC
mode, respectively. After performing the “Suspend”
operation, the VIF is disabled and destroyed, and the
VIF ID is Null. When the VM state is transited to
“Running” again by the “Resume” operation, a new
VIF will be recreated and enabled, and the VIF ID¤
X. When a VIF has been destroyed, it does not need

Tsinghua Science and Technology, October 2014, 19(5): 496-507
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Fig. 5

Current state
Transfer
Running
Hibernate
Save
Shutdown
Running

VM life cycle state transition diagram and VIF state.

Table 2 State transitions and operations that affect the effectiveness of VIF network policies.
Transition operation
Next state
Impact on VIF
Start
Boot
Create
Reboot
Running
Re-create (destroy and create)
Resume
Running
Create
Restore
Running
Create
Start
Boot
Create
Live migrate
Migrate
Destroy exist VIF in source host and create new VIF in destination host

to maintain corresponding policies continually and just
needs to notify the OFC or SDC to delete the VM
related policies in the switch.
According to Fig. 5, we discovered the VM state
transitions and operations that had effects on the VIF
and VIF ID, shown in Table 2, which were needed to
trigger policy re-configurations for the VM.
For VM live migration cases, there are two hosts
involved: the source host will destroy the existing
VIF and the destination host will create a new
VIF. According to the principle of VM live migration,
the new VIF has been created and is ready at the
moment of beginning to migrate VM states (CPU,
memory states, etc.) to the destination host. We chose
the moment of “Running” changing to “Live Migrate”
to reconfigure network policies into the new OVS to
avoid a policy lacking period from emerging.
Furthermore, we used the following mechanisms to
time monitor the state transitions that stratified the
entries in Table 2.
(a) Time monitor the VM state. We created a VM life
cycle transition table according to Fig. 5, and defined
the return transition values in detail. A table entry,

such as “Current state, Transition operation, Return
value, Next state”, contains values such as “Running,
Suspend, Success, Hibernate”. Then, according to
the table, the VM life cycle management module
could update the VM state in the life cycle state table
shown in Fig. 4 at the moment the corresponding
state transition operation finished.
(b) Time monitor the VM state transition. We
monitored the update operation that applied to the
VM life cycle state table. As soon as a state transition
that satisfied the entries in Table 2 was detected,
an event notifying the network policy module to reconfigure policy for the corresponding VM would
be triggered automatically. Then, according to the
VEB working mode, the related flow entries were
actively pushed into an OVS VM connected by the
OFC, or the related network policies corresponding
configurations for OVS ports were configured into an
OVS VM connected by the SDC and OVS agent.
2.3

Software defined isolation network

Based on the above mechanisms of VM traffic
redirection and access control, and network policy
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unified management, a tenant virtual security isolation
network or domain could be built flexibly by VLAN
or Firewall. For a VLAN mechanism, according to
the tenants’ on-demand requirements of the security
domain division, the VLAN TAGs of the tenant VMs
were configured into the OVS by the network controller
(e.g., configuration operations were performed by either
the OFC or the SDC). For Firewall mechanisms,
based on the mechanism of traffic redirection as
shown in Fig. 4, virtual firewall appliances in the
form of a perimeter firewall formed the tenant
isolation network. Through instantiating respective
firewall appliances for different tenants’ VMs and
configuring access control communication rules into
appliances for tenant VMs, and redirecting VM traffic
to corresponding appliances, the isolation network
could be built.
Moreover, because the Firewall was provided in
the form of a virtual security appliance that was
encapsulated in a VM, the computing capacity
of the firewall could be provided elastically by
taking advantage of the hypervisor’s (e.g., Xen
Hypervisor) ability to compute resource adjustment
dynamically. Additionally, the Firewall function could
be expanded by introducing the module of Netfilter
Layer 7-Filter to realize deep packet inspection and
deep access control.
2.4

Security supplementary

Besides the above security supporting mechanisms,
tenants should have the ability to know the
vulnerabilities of their VMs. We built a vulnerability
scanning framework as a service to tenants, based on a
lightweight monitoring agent for IaaS platforms. The
framework, shown in Fig. 6, is composed of the
monitoring agent, a vulnerability scanning engine, a
vulnerability knowledge base, and a communication
encryption mechanism.
(1) The lightweight monitoring agent hosts and runs
in VMs to gather VMs’ states, including open ports
and current running services.
(2) The vulnerability scanning engine is responsible
for performing vulnerability analyses and
permeability tests according to the information
provided by the monitoring agent.
(3) The vulnerability knowledge base aims to provide
scanning plugins for the vulnerability scanning
engine.
When a tenant requests the vulnerability scanning

Fig. 6
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The vulnerability scanning mechanisms.

service for his VMs, the agents hosted and run in
the VMs send the VMs’ current states, including
information on open ports and running services, in a
compressed and encrypted form to the vulnerability
scanning engine. Then, the engine selects related
scanning plugins from the knowledge base to construct
a plugin set, creates worker threads to perform
scanning tasks, and finally returns the scanning result.
The mechanism optimizes the process of traditional
vulnerability scanning tools, because the step of port
scanning is minus as the agent gathers the related
information actively. The computing and network
resources that are used for port probing are reduced,
and the overloads are shared between participating
VMs that request the scanning service.
Furthermore, as time goes on, the software
installed in the VM should be updated and
patched to avoid attack via known vulnerabilities,
or to improve performance and stability. A
software update mechanism to provide updates as
a service was implemented to satisfy the above
requirement. Similarly, based on the above monitoring
agent, when a tenant launches a software update
request, the installed software package information
is sent to a local update server in a compressed and
encrypted form. Then, the server returns the new
software package information after comparing the
received information with the latest information it
has. Finally, tenants can choose to install software or
patches. Additionally, for a scenario in which a tenant
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has many VMs and requests multiple software copies
to update, a reliable multicast mechanism based on IP
multicast was introduced to mitigate the update-storm.
From the above discussion, the topology of the
proposed dynamic network security architecture
is shown in Fig. 7. It divides the network into a
management network and a data network, which are
responsible for carrying IaaS platform management
traffic and VMs traffic, respectively. The IaaS controller
manages the infrastructures for both tenants’ VMs and
for security appliances.
As shown in Fig. 7, the vulnerability scanning engine
and software update engine provide corresponding
service interfaces for tenants via the data network,
while the management operations for scanning
plugins in the vulnerability scanning engine, and
updating packages in the software update engine, are
performed by the IaaS controller via the management
network. Moreover, virtual IDS/Firewall appliances
are provided in the form of virtual machines that are
used to detect and control VM traffic access. After
configuring the IDS/Firewall for VMs, the VM traffic
is redirected to the security appliances via the data
network after the appliances have been instantiated by
the IaaS controller via the management network. The
firewall rules for virtual firewall appliances can be
configured by tenants via the data network, according
to specific access control requirements. In addition,
with the help of a network policy unified management
mechanism in the IaaS controller, the policies (e.g.,

Fig. 7

VLAN, traffic redirection) configured for VMs are
effective throughout the whole life cycle of the VM by
configuring the policies at the right place and time by
the IaaS controller via the management network.

3

Experimental Campaign and Discussion

We employed normal PC servers, Gigabit Ethernet
switches, and Gigabit NICs to build our IaaS platform,
as shown in Fig. 7. We made use of OpenNebula
as the IaaS resource management toolkit, and the
shared storage was provided through NFS. Other key
parameters were Xen as the hypervisor, Open v-Switch
as the VEB, NOX as the OFC, MySQL as the database,
and CentOS 5.8 x64 version as the host and guest
operating system. Based on the two-layer structure
and communication mechanism in OpenNebula[10] , the
resource management module and SDC in the network
controller shown in Figs. 1 and 4 communicated with
the Xen hypervisor and OVS agent via the SSH channel
on the management network, while the OFC in the
network controller used Open v-Switch over the TLS
on the management network.
3.1

VM traffic redirection

We instantiated two VMs named VM-1 and VM-2,
respectively, instantiated a virtual IDS appliance, and
configured it as a security appliance for VM-1. The IP
parameters of the VMs were “202.115.36.217” for VM1, “202.115.36.218” for VM-2, and “202.115.36.220”
for V-IDS. The tests and results are shown in Fig. 8.

The topology of dynamic network architecture for IaaS platforms.
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Fig. 8

VM traffic redirection test.

The ICMP echo request message sent by VM-1
was redirected to V-IDS, the V-IDS sent a redirect
datagram to VM-1, and sent the request message to
VM-2. Similarly, the ICMP echo reply message sent
by VM-2 was redirected to V-IDS and sent to VM1 by V-IDS. We performed more than 1000 ping
operations. The results show that the average time
consumed for “VM-1 PING VM-2” after configuring
V-IDS for VM-1 was about 1.25 milliseconds in our
experimental environment, with about half of the time
consumed by forwarding the traffic to the security
appliance.
3.2

Network policy dynamic configuration

We took VM state transitions from “Shutdown” to
“Boot” and “Running” to “Live Migrate”, as examples
to illustrate. We instantiated three VMs, named VM1, VM-2, and VM-3, respectively, chose VLAN as the
network policy, and set policies “VLAN TAG=6” for
VM-1, “VLAN TAG=6” for VM-2, and did not set
a VLAN policy for VM-3. The tests for configuring
policy effectiveness and results are shown in Table 3.
The performance and efficiency of the policy
configuration mechanism are analyzed as follows. The
experimental results showed that the average
consumed time T VIF of configuring policy by
the network controllers (OFC and SDC) was about 300
milliseconds. In addition, according to the method of
VM instantiation, which brought the VM into a running
Table 3
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state as shown in Fig. 5 and Table 2, the methods can
be classified into three types, as below.
(1) Through the normal way to instantiate a VM, such
as “Transfer” to “Running” via “Start”. The waiting
time is determined mainly by VM configuration
parameters including CPU performance, memory
capacity, and OS type before the VM is accessible.
(2) Instantiate a VM by resuming the state-saved
files of the CPU, memory, etc., such as “Hibernate”
to “Running” via “Resume”. The waiting time is
determined mainly by VM configuration parameters
including CPU performance and memory capacity
before the VM is accessible.
(3) Instantiate a VM by creating a new VM container
and copying the state of the CPU and memory from
the source VM, such as “Running” to “Running”
via “Live Migrate”. The waiting time is determined
mainly by VM configuration parameters including
CPU performance and memory capacity, and the
network bandwidth capacity between source host and
destination host before the new VM is accessible.
The statistics tests indicated that a VM instantiated
in the above three ways needed at least several seconds
(T OS) to be ready, accessible, and useable. The time
point of the configuring policy was at the moment
of VM power-on while the VIF was prepared and
beginning to instantiate the VM. Based on T VIF 
T OS, the proposed management mechanism for the
network policy could ensure the effectiveness of the
network policy during the total life cycle of the VM.
3.3

Security supplementary

We employed OpenVAS as the vulnerability scanning
engine, and built a local update server that synchronized
software and patches daily with the CentOS official
server. We took FTP anonymous logins detection as
an example to illustrate the vulnerability scanning
mechanism. When a tenant launched a vulnerability
scanning request for a VM, which was running an
FTP service and opening port 21, the monitoring
agent gathered and sent the states, including current
running services and open ports information, to
the vulnerability scanning engine in a compressed
and encrypted form. Then, the engine selected

The tests and results of network policy dynamic configuration.

Test
“VM-2 ping VM-1” continuously before VM-1 booted
“VM-3 ping VM-1” continuously before VM-1 booted
“VM-3 ping VM-1” after VM-1 ran and live migrate VM-1 to other host

Result
VM-2 can establish connection to VM-1 after VM-1 ran.
VM-3 can’t establish connection to VM-1 continuously.
VM-3 can’t establish connection to VM-1 continuously.
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“ftp anonymous login.nasl” scanning plugin to
construct a plugin set and created worker threads to
perform the scanning task. Finally, the engine provided
security advice to tenants, based on scanning return
values. For FTP service, the FTP scanning plugin would
attempt to login “FTP” on the target host with a random
username and password. If “FTP” could be logged
in successfully with “anonymous” as a username and
an empty password, the engine would provide risk
information and a solution to the tenant. Similarly,
when the tenant launched a software update request,
the software update engine would return the latest
information about software installed on the VM. The
vulnerability and software update report is shown in
Fig. 9.

4

Conclusions

the policies to the right place at the appropriate
time point, according to the factors affecting the
effectiveness of the VIF’s policy and the impacts
brought by VM state transitions. Additionally, tenants
could build their virtual security domain flexibly
by making use of VLAN or Netfilter/Iptables firewall
appliances. Furthermore, cooperating with vulnerability
scanning services, software update services, V-IDS
appliances, and automatic alarm mechanisms, the
proposed architecture could dynamically mitigate a
wide range of network-based attacks.
In future, we aim to optimize policy configuration
mechanisms
for
performance,
realize
VM
imperceptibility communication encryption, and
detect consistency between VM network behaviors and
network policy configurations.
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